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Introduction
This is the first of a series of articles exploring current
implications of the Treaty of Waitangi for New Zealand
governance.  Here, the objective is to locate the
persistent Maori demand for some form of self-
government in its democratic context of government-
by-consent. The argument is that the issues are not
conceptually difficult. In particular, fears about
‘sovereignty’ are unwarranted.  The current burst of
activity in ‘Treaty negotiation’ is not a threat to New
Zealand’s democracy, but a sign of its strength – a
positive and expected part of the constitutional system.
As in any democracy, however, there are legitimate
questions about the framework within which such
negotiation takes place and its limits.
Self-determination is a major theme across human history
and across cultures.  All societies have had to negotiate
and fight their way through the changing relativity of
authority between self, family, group, tribe, nation and
empire.  In the New Zealand context, this pattern
predates European settlement - witness the ebb and flow
of authority amongst the Polynesian groups who sailed
to these islands. Post-1840, self-determination was the
key theme in the attainment of self-government and
eventual independence from Britain.
The distinctive characteristics of the New Zealand
experience lie in the unique language, history and present
role of the Treaty.  Perhaps this obscures the fact that
the issues raised in the “Treaty debate” reflect similar
problems of governance everywhere.  The argument
presented here therefore locates the particular challenges
of the Treaty in a broader democratic context - namely
that all governments face limits to their power.  Quite simply,
this should dispose of the notion that ‘sovereignty’ issues
form an insuperable barrier.  It is then possible to see
self-determination questions as part of an ongoing
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negotiation of relative degrees of autonomy, within a
system based on government-by-consent.
The limits to all claims of power
Across history, the limits to power have always been
the subject of debate, political action, war, and, more
recently, constitutionalism.  How far can a particular
minority assert its distinctiveness and not become too
divisive, perhaps bloody, for society as a whole?  How
far can a majority assert its numerical, cultural or other
dominance without crushing the distinctiveness of
smaller groups?  What are the limits of domination,
and of resistance to such?  In the fast-churning washing
machine of today’s world, with accelerating movement
of peoples, economies and cultures, what is the ‘right
to self-determination’?  Put differently, are there limits
to both ‘majority rule’ and ‘self-determination’ where
distinct communities live together?
The New Zealand version of these questions can be
briefly stated: what are the limits in the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi, implicit in the juxtaposition of national
powers of governance in article 1, the Maori/tribal
powers of self-rule in article 2, and the rights of equal
citizenship in article 3?
The proposition that there must be limits to all human
conduct, and certainly to the assertion of a ‘freedom’
or ‘right’ of any description, is relatively simple.   The
fact of living together requires that any claimed right is
limited by the rights of others.  This provides limits
everywhere, from personal choices (like sexual
partnerships, or where to live) to claimed rights to
speech, movement, association, political activity, and
the use of property, for example.
The notion that there are limits has not of course
stopped people or governments claiming absolute powers
or rights – or even exercising what looks like absolute
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power for a period if backed by sufficient force to crush
objections.  But over-riding dominance is always
temporary (though the night may at times be long for
individuals or peoples subject to such).  Louis XIV’s
claims to absolute power and the Divine Right of
Kings was a good line, but it soon seemed just silly.
The Orwellian power behind the Iron Curtain had
some limits in the Communist Party system, it was
certainly contested and, under myriad pressures, it
could not last.
To an intuitive argument that there must be limits arising
from the fact that other people have rights too, one
thus might add centuries of history, philosophy and
countless court cases affirming the limits on human
claims to absolute rights.  A simple illustration of the
general point lies in the ongoing exploration of what
some have claimed as virtually absolute powers of
private owners to do what they like with “their” private
property.  The answers are the same: ownership is not
absolute; there are limits on one’s actions arising from
the fact of community.
There is thus no difficulty in principle with the notion
that all rights are restricted by the rights of others – the
questions are rather what is reasonable and fair, and
what particular balance might apply at a point in time.
One law for all…
The same argument applies to another conceptual
blockage. The undisputed importance of all citizens
being ‘equal before the law’ should not suggest that
there is in any sense ‘one law for all’.  A multiplicity of
laws apply to people in different circumstances, every
day.  Directors of companies have laws that apply only
to them, and not to other parts of the company; squash
clubs have their own rules that do not apply to non-
members; Maori tribes have laws that do not bind other
Maori, let alone Pakeha.  New Zealand, like every other
society, lives with a plurality of laws within one umbrella
legal system. Indeed, there is a multiplicity of specialist
courts that apply those different laws.
The same argument applies to discrimination.  Whilst
it is unlawful to discriminate on some grounds in some
areas of activity, there is constant differentiation
elsewhere in both the law and public policy: only those
over 65 get state pensions, only migrants pay significant
fees to apply for a state service (permission to
immigrate), only school children get certain dental
benefits, universities admit students on a number of
grounds of differentiation, etc.
In reality, the legal system does not expect or guarantee
exact equality, but something closer to relative fairness
and relative protection, guided by standards that change
as societies re-assess what is fair and just.  Nevertheless,
an overarching authority in the court system is important
as a symbol of some sense of unity in all this diversity;
this is now achieved ultimately through the Supreme
Court in New Zealand.  The point, simply stated, is that
the rhetoric of ‘one law for all’ is just that.
“Sovereignty”
Let me set up starkly where the above discussion leaves
us in relation to the New Zealand Parliament and self-
government/tino-rangatiratanga.  Any suggestion of
‘sovereignty’ meaning ‘absolute power’ is nonsense from
first principles.  Whatever the  nineteenth century
conceptualisation, no group of people meeting in a
building (however grand and symbolic) has absolute
power in practice, philosophy or law.  The rubric of
the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament should thus
be read much more simply as the (mostly) superior
powers of governance.   Governments operate within
limits that come from politics, convention,
parliamentary tradition, international law, fundamental
rights, the law and from other important rules which
society has endorsed in various ways.
The New Zealand constitutional system, therefore,
emerges not with ‘sovereignty’ located in one institution,
much less a person, certainly not in a symbol like ‘the
Crown’, and not in any one or many dozens of scattered
Maori tribes and sub-tribes.  If by ‘sovereignty’ one
means the ultimate power of decision-making, then that
is surely shared in processes that reflect collective self-
governance by all New Zealand citizens – more
particularly, in their interactive negotiation as they deal
with the power and resource issues of the day.
The word ‘sovereign’ of course carries its history from
western European thinking as the concept of the state
developed.  That tradition came to see ultimate power
as  located or epitomised in the person and institution
of the monarch: the Sovereign. And, in the
Parliamentary tradition, as the reality of governance slid
from the monarch to the monarch’s advisers (the
cabinet) drawn from elected representatives, it was easy
to widen the location of supposed ‘sovereignty’ to
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include those elected representatives.  All this was very
mystical.  It continues today in the notion that
responsibility for government resides in one eternal and
ever-governing (and hence ever-defending) ‘Crown’,
instead of  ‘the Government of the day’, or ‘the state’.
I suspect that if one today asked a random foreign
observer, a modern Alexis de Tocqueville, to locate
‘sovereignty’ in the workings of New Zealand’s
democratic constitution, the result would be more
practical than mystical.  The heart of our governance
is in government-by-consent.  Parliament is a critical
part of that, of course, hence the importance attached
to the legitimacy cycle of elections-mandates-coalitions-
tax-budget-accountability-elections.  Bills passed by
Parliament also trump, as law, the product of other
governmental institutions.  It is perhaps this ‘legal
superiority’ that suggests to some that Parliament is
all-powerful, and also that has led it to become a focus
of authority in its own right rather than as part of
government-by-consent.
Seeing sovereignty/tino rangatiratanga
as process
It is not tenable to accept the notion that a New Zealand
Parliament has unlimited power. Mostly, the limits are
found in the heart of what makes the New Zealand
constitution tick: an acceptance that ‘the people’ are
the sole source of ultimate authority and that the
questions of the day must be solved through
government-by-consent.  That consensus would, in
almost all conceivable circumstances, provide limitations
to what is done by any government and to what it
requires of Parliament.  But I have no doubt that in
extreme circumstances the courts would simply strike
down some parliamentary action as unlawful.  The
question is not, to my mind, one of principle, but of
being able to recognize a ‘really bad case’.  If all sides
note this possibility, that case might conveniently never
arise, leaving all sides happy -  albeit sometimes a bit
huffy and puffy.
If Parliament is not an all-powerful despotic institution,
there is similarly no unlimited ‘right’ to self-
determination.  Tino rangatiratanga (by any translation,
including ‘Maori sovereignty’), is thus a claim to self-
rule with limitations.  Most people probably understand
the need for a tribe to see itself as standing eye-to-eye
with the ‘other side’ in the Treaty relationship.  But
there is abundant room in the negotiation process of
this democracy for mana (here: appropriate respect,
authority, dignity) to be accorded to all parties, including
the times when government ministers and negotiators
appear on tribal marae.  Even on its own terms, the
concept and practice of chiefly rule was never that of
unlimited power.  Mana always had to be earned and
sustained, whatever the boost that noble birth might
have given.
It is important to see our history in perspective.  Over
the centuries, there have been many strong Maori
leaders, but there is no suggestion that any rangatira
ever had, or sought, the kind of authoritarian and
absolute power associated with a pharaoh, a
Montezuma, a Ceaucescu, or any other human despot.
Similarly, there has always been dynamism in the relative
authority between the levels of tribal organisation of
family/sub-tribe/tribe (whanau/hapu/iwi).  Those
tensions continue to this day and no tribal leader can
claim the right  to  trump totally, let alone extinguish,
the authority/rangatiratanga of a constituent hapu.
If tribal governance has always been limited and
contestable in relation to its own followers, it follows
that the degrees of autonomy and power that any tribe
might have in relation to any external competitor were
(and are) similarly qualified.  The pursuit of mana
(here: authority) in the Maori world is a nice parallel
to the competitiveness of the wider political and
economic world.  None of this is to suggest that in
particular respects (eg, rights to customary fishing in
a given locality) a Maori tribe might not have greater
rights than any other competitor (flowing from the
status of tangata whenua).
In short, there should be no suggestion the nation is
confronting some clash of absolutes: either (a supposedly
Pakeha or even ‘foreign’) Parliament is ‘sovereign’, all-
powerful, in-charge, or Maori institutions of some sort
are ‘sovereign’, all-powerful, in-charge...  Faced with the
irresistible-force versus immoveable-object trap, most people
instinctively refuse to accept it, as they should.
Fundamentally, there is no standoff here between
overall governance (article 1 of the Treaty) and Maori
tribal governance (article 2).  The constitution reflects
instead relative degrees of power - as well as relative
degrees of autonomy.  Such logic does not of course
mean that some powers might not wax and wane over
time, as they have always done.
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Changing times and limits
To a historian, it would be obvious that the limits on
any notion of power, including majority rule and self-
determination, are not fixed in stone but are negotiated
in different ways as circumstances change.  The real
questions, therefore, concern the processes in any
society for determining and balancing the limits.
In relation to self-determination, what seems
inconceivable at one point in time may become
commonplace at another.   With hindsight one can be
simply baffled at the apparent stupidity that sent people
to war.  In this century, the phenomenon of an expanded
European Union will remove the potential for internal
wars – this in a continent where throughout recorded
history, issues of self determination and dominance
sparked massive conflict, culminating in two World Wars.
And all those everlasting empires long broken into smaller
bits (Central American, African, European, Russian,
Asian) seem like fables from the Lord of the Rings, not
places where so often the unity forged by blood, steel
and lead was destroyed by the same means.
In Maori terms, tradition tells broadly of origin myths
from the Gods (with some nice parallels with Greek
and Roman mythology) and their own struggles for
dominance and autonomy. In the movement out of
Polynesia, the pattern is of early canoe migrations to
these islands, followed by the establishment of tribes
and then centuries of flux in which tribes branched
and sub-branched and sometimes merged and re-
merged. The pursuit of mana has been described as a
core motivating aspect of Maori culture – and that
pursuit would have seen constant fluctuation in the
standing of any particular group (or individual).
If accurate, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of
this in the context of New Zealand’s constitutional
system as argued above.  If government-by-consent is
at the heart what New Zealand does, and if every Maori
group sees the possibility of negotiating its way to
increase the mana of the individual or group, then there
is a very busy period ahead.  But none of this is a threat
to the constitutional system – just the contrary, it is a
confirmation of its health.
As New Zealand struggles with the apparent difficulty
of reaching any single, durable, constitutional solution
to the question of the place of the Treaty in New
Zealand governance, the key is therefore to see all
governance, including Maori self-governance, as a
framework for negotiation within limits.  Put simply,
and shorn of the mysticism of ‘the Crown’, the issues
involve the relationships between peoples in a state,
and between central and Maori spheres of governance.
However hard any particular group (a hapu, Maori in
general, or any others such as farmers, workers, the poor,
families, battlers, the rich, the creators of wealth) tries
to insist upon its distinctiveness to justify its particular
claim to maximise its ‘rights’, in the end this is all
negotiation within a kiwi democracy.
This is not to reduce Maori under the Treaty to exactly
the same status as other bargainers in other phases of
government-by-consent.  The fact of the Treaty, and
more particularly the importance (even reverence)
attached to it by Maori, does confer a distinctive
character on the Maori dialogue with government.  This
goes to the heart of the social contract that is our
democracy. This has been increasingly recognised, and
more widely accepted by all citizens.  The history of
colonisation, including a domestic war, means that the
nature of the Maori negotiation will always be unique
within New Zealand.
Despite all this distinctiveness, Maori nonetheless are
just part of the normal negotiation process in this
democracy – players amongst many, bargainers amongst
many (including each other).  The partners to the entire
New Zealand social contract need each other, as it were,
to keep reaffirming basic aspects of the rule of law
and the authority of elected parliaments.   And Maori
and the other communities particularly need each other
– because they cannot back away from the history of
human settlement in Aotearoa New Zealand, and also
because their futures are linked increasingly by
intermarriage, whakapapa and all the elements of a
shared national identity.  That particular die was cast
even before the Treaty came into being.
The simplicity of the view of Maori as distinctive, but
nonetheless ‘amongst many’ players in a negotiating
democracy, might disappoint some.  But for most it
should be comforting, especially for those who hear
echoes, in the occasional strident voice, of
repression-resistance from other times in this
country, as well as from other struggles abroad.  Fears
that we might again be approaching a time when
violence could erupt are not without all possibility,
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though much is arguably tabloid journalism and
political opportunism.  There is no real evidence to
suggest that the sky is about to fall in.
Indeed, events in 2004 produced for many in New
Zealand a sense that in negotiating how far resistance
might go, the country peered over the edge of our
current flexible political structures – saw an unhappy
alternative, and quietly pulled back.  Thus, in the biggest
Maori protest march ever seen in New Zealand (the
hikoi to protest  against the government’s seabed and
foreshore policy) the atmosphere was festive and
colourful, the crowd mixed, behaviour was orderly and
lawful, the speeches were fiery but faced down by
government ministers who sat safely, unprotected and
unharmed in front of tens of thousands of
protesters… That night, there were no riots, no attacks,
no burning tires.  Parliament continued sitting peacefully.
The next day, one had the sense that a party had come
to town.  The protest was thus not a threat to democracy
and the rule of law, but an affirmation of both: a strong
and vocal challenge to government policy, true, but
negotiation within a peaceful, political, distinctively
Aotearoa New Zealand framework.
Tino rangatiratanga
The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975, first to
hear Maori claims that the Treaty of Waitangi was not
being honoured in current government policy and
action. Then, in 1985, its jurisdiction was extended to
hear Maori claims that the Treaty had not been
honoured from its signing in 1840, to current times.
Adding the historical jurisdiction was a breathtaking
move, exposing the country to a searching re-
examination of its entire history after colonisation.  Few
countries could comfortably re-examine the last century
and a half through modern eyes.  So far as I am aware,
there is no exact precedent.
The political judgement that New Zealand should
re-examine in detail the hurts of the past in order to
build a stronger nation was therefore made 20 years
ago.  My metaphor is that the country is ‘in the gorge’
downstream from that decision; there is little option
but to paddle on an even keel as steadily as possible,
to calmer waters further down the river.  However,
the way in which the process has evolved, and the
way it will develop from now on, has profound
implications for the way in which contemporary
issues are negotiated and debated through the
political system.
This is particularly so for the relationship between the
key articles of the Treaty. Much writing has been
devoted to the significance of differences between the
Maori and English texts and this is not the place to re-
examine those issues.  For this paper, a sufficient
summary is that Article 1 establishes the authority of
central government; Article 2 preserves Maori land,
forests, fisheries, other valued resources and tribal
governance to themselves, and establishes that if land
is to be sold voluntarily, it must be sold to the
government; and Article 3 states in essence that Maori
will have the same rights as non-Maori.  Unsurprisingly,
almost all claims are based on Article 2.
The key point is that in either language, this is an explicit
social contract and agreement on governance.  There is
agreement that there will be a central process of
government, of which Maori will be a part.  At the
same time, Maori will retain self-government and their
assets, as long as they wish.  On one level, this social
contract simply reflected English statute and common
law, which at least since Magna Carta in 1215 has
provided a protection of private custom and property
within the overall umbrella of monarchical-
parliamentary rule.
The words are of course important, but the statutory
requirement is that the Tribunal apply the Treaty
“principles” in deciding if there has been compliance.
Herein lies considerable scope for measuring
historical actions against principle – especially
notions of good faith, or equal partnership. The
Reports of the Tribunal contain a wealth of
information on New Zealand’s history, and are
increasingly themselves the object of analysis and
historical scholarship.  In relation to the historical
jurisdiction, a claim process solely to hear Maori
complaints about governments’ compliance over one
hundred and fifty years has (predictably, given a
history of colonisation and war) found
overwhelmingly in favour of Maori claimants.
There has however been a growing concern that the
Tribunal has been unable to escape the danger of
“presentism”, i.e. seeing history through today’s eyes,
standards and judgements.  This suggests that its role
requires careful thought, if for no other reason than
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that the credibility of the whole process is at risk.  But
in the meanwhile, the inevitable result has been to alter
the conditions under which New Zealand’s
government-by-consent negotiation process is taking
place.  The Tribunal has created a situation in which
the balance has shifted in favour of Maori, simply
because it brings historical detail and contemporary
awareness to the process.  As a result, there is indeed
a momentum of claim and negotiation across the
public and private sectors, and a new economy
emerging from settlements.  Some will however
continue to question the net benefits of this process,
often described as a “Treaty industry”.
A shifting political balance…
In terms of restoring balance, the political process has
itself responded, especially over the last thirty years.
Through the reserved seats in Parliament, Maori have
long been guaranteed participation in governance and
the significance of this has arguably increased since the
introduction of proportional representation.  The
interplay here between active participation in Article 1
(national governance/kawanatanga) and Article 2 (tribal
governance/rangatiratanga) is one of the more
interesting aspects of the overall process.
Are the current structures of government-by-consent
sufficiently flexible to cope with this burgeoning
activity? Is change needed? What might be some key
policy responses?
The answers must be explored in future papers and
only a few points can be made here.  From a policy
point of view, it now seems inevitable, and necessary,
that some limit will be put on the historical claims
process.  Otherwise, there might be no end to the
process of looking backwards and reliving past wrongs.
No society can cope indefinitely with the tensions that
inevitably emerge from such an examination.
The issues that do require further thought include the
recurring theme in virtually all of the Tribunal’s Reports:
its insistence that Article 2 established an ongoing
“Crown” fiduciary duty to each tribe, implying that the
Crown was required to ensure the cultural (and possibly
economic) viability of the tribe.  In the Reports, this
theme emerges from the words of Article 2 and the
finding of a ‘principle’ behind them.
The policy question that arises, therefore, is whether
government can or should pre-empt much of the
criticism, by establishing criteria under which central
government (including Maori) will recognise (and
possibly assist) Maori groups in the management of
some element of Maori self-government?  A related
question is whether there is any limit, time or other, to
this process?  Underlying all policy options is a key
balance between ‘rights’ that call for a court-related
process in determining their limits, and ‘claims’ where
the primary issues are political, and hence for the
executive/legislature to deal with.
Shorn, then, of the rhetoric of sovereignty as unlimited
power, the issues are surprisingly simple.  Those tribes
that have received substantial settlements are today busy
exercising aspects of their self-government/tino
rangatiratanga through the management of assets.  In
many areas, tribes are exercising their own powers in
closely cooperative relationship with central government.
A nice and largely unknown example concerns Maori
customary fishing rights, where local tribes establish their
customary rules (reflecting tino rangatiratanga), and the
state (kawanatanga) extends the protection of the
ordinary criminal law and courts to enforce those rules
as against any person fishing in the area.
None of this threatens either the national authority of
parliament or tino rangatiratanga. It is an expression of
both.  Just as any group in New Zealand might claim
and exercise some aspect of self governance (local
government, clubs, societies, professions), so it is
conceptually simple to create a framework for tino
rangatiratanga to evolve as an explicit aspect of
government policy and law.  If Maori are seeking
representation of their tribe in dealings with central and
local government and in asset management, it is not
difficult to give clarity and certainty to legal frameworks
for such – indeed, it is essential, especially given the
growing economic importance of tribal business.
Conclusion
If the heart of New Zealand’s constitutional system is
government-by-consent, then the Treaty-driven
activities are part of the heartbeat.  We have seen that
the Treaty explicitly sets up a social contract involving
both central government (in which Maori can and do
participate significantly) and tribal authority/assets
(which has always featured, but more so under the
settlement process).  As a result of the introduction of
a new institution (the Tribunal) into the ongoing
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process, we can also register a significant shift in the
weight given by government institutions to this process.
For their part, Maori are now better resourced, better
engaged, better lawyered and better politically-
represented in New Zealand’s democratic negotiation.
This is delivering a far better crack at the negotiation
than over the last 160 years.  But it has limits, like
everything, and most of these flow directly from the
pervasive and progressive involvement of Maori in all
aspects of community and society in New Zealand.
The improved position is reflected in changes which
are very much in the public eye: the use of Maori
language (especially in the current format of the national
anthem), the linked names of “New Zealand Aotearoa”
on passports (a significant international statement,
although unnoticed domestically), the removal of much
(but not all) of the discrimination that characterised
New Zealand social and public life in the past, and the
integration of a ‘Maori dimension’ into a great deal of
government policy and law.
As the elections in 2005 approach, the appropriate
response to the sustained claim for tino rangatiratanga
may again loom large.  The argument of this paper is
that this trend is an expected, and indeed confirming,
part of government-by-consent.
The real issue is therefore not about sovereignty, but
about making things work.  That will require us to test
the limits of political acceptability to the whole society
as well as to individual Maori tribes, of the amount of
money it might reasonably cost, and of the mandate
for the institutions that will decide these issues.
Removing the conceptual blocks is the indispensable
first step.  All parties then need to see the mutual rewards
to be derived from a unique negotiation process, which
now offers a template for New Zealand democracy.
Such discussions should be seen as deepening our
democracy, not threatening it.  That said, there is good
historical and comparative reason why the more extreme
rhetoric needs to be tempered.  Going outside the
boundaries of peaceful negotiation, especially if real
or perceived injustice is inflamed (as happened in the
former Yugoslavia with the emergence of “virulent
ethnic entrepreneurship”) is a less promising option.
It would take the current vibrant engagement down a
less happy road.
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